Be afraid, ASEAN countries. Of a South China Sea code of
conduct, I mean. The only code of conduct worth having would be one by
which China renounces its nine-dashed line of the region and the
associated territorial claims; matches its words with deeds by
evacuating sites it has poached from other countries' exclusive economic
zones; stops asserting the right to proscribe certain foreign naval
activities within the nine-dashed line; and agrees that the purpose of
any code of conduct is to lock in the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea as the regional status quo.
Anyone want to place odds on Beijing's doing any one of these things?
Me neither. All of them? Fuggedaboutit. If ASEAN consents to a code of
conduct anyway, it will have ratified the current state of affairs,
including China's seizures of Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef, deep
within the Philippine EEZ. Southeast Asian countries will have consented
to a region wide protection racket, in hopes that letting China keep
its past gains will purchase its forbearance and goodwill in the future.
Good luck with that one. It's rather as though a less kind, gentle
Naval Diplomat pointed a gun at you and demanded money to protect you
from … me! Such bargains with the Family seldom work out well in
gangster films. Life imitates art in this case. The international
relations counterpart is what scholars call bandwagoning. Weaker states
prefer to band together to offset strong, domineering powers prone to
trampling their interests and security. But if the weak are unable to
balance a would-be hegemon, they may align themselves with it. They
agree to the hegemon's demands in hopes of buying peace while retaining
as much of their sovereignty and preserving as many of their interests
as they can.
Trouble is, such arrangements are perishable. They only last until
the Family decides it needs more. Then the leg-breakers up their
demands. Needless to say, the price of protection has a way of going up
over time.
Philippine foreign minister Albert del Rosario understands the
dynamics at work in the South China Sea. "We think that China is trying
to stay ahead of the CoC," del Rosario told Reuters
this week. The code of conduct will look forward in an effort to defuse
future controversies, not back to reverse past offenses. Beijing,
accordingly, is pushing "an assertion agenda." It will grab what it can,
then agree to a code that guarantees it can keep what it just grabbed.
That becomes the new normal.
There's ample precedent for using laws or international covenants to cement your gains. British scholar Ken Booth recalls that seafaring
states scrambled for maritime territory during the 1970s and early
1980s, at the same time they were negotiating UNCLOS. And one doubts
that was the first time states gamed international law in such fashion.
So Manila is right to cry foul about Beijing's agenda. Don Xi Jinping
and his Family are a particularly demanding, unforgiving lot. If they
won't let the explicit text of a treaty — a treaty to which China has
consented — restrain their ambitions, why expect a code of conduct to?
Beware of bandwagoning, Southeast Asians, unless you're prepared to pay
up — again and again. By
James R. Holmes.The Diplomat, September 5, 2013
China has ordered foreign fishing vessels to obtain approval from
regional authorities before fishing or surveying in two thirds of the
South China Sea, setting up the potential for new confrontations between
Beijing and its neighbors over maritime sovereignty claims to disputed
islands.
The new orders went into effect Jan. 1 after they were issued late November by Hainan island provincial government authorities.
Under the new regulations, all foreign fishing boats that transit
into a new Hainan’s administrative zone in the sea—an area covering
two-thirds of the 1.5 million square mile South China Sea—must be
approved by Chinese authorities.
The new measures were imposed Nov. 29 and announced Dec. 3 in state
media as part of a policy of enforcing Chinese fisheries law.
Chinese law states that any ships that violate the fishing
regulations will be forced out of the zone, have their catch
confiscated, and face fines of up to $82,600. In some cases, fishing
boats could be confiscated and their crew prosecuted under Chinese law.
It is the first time China has made a clear legal claim to disputed
fishing grounds claimed by Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and
other states in the region.
A Chinese maritime patrol boat struck a Vietnamese fishing boat Jan. 3
near the Paracel Islands in the first incident under the new rules,
according to Vietnamese state media. The Chinese used Tasers and batons
to subdue the fishermen and confiscated their 5-ton catch of fish along
with fishing equipment. The incident was reported on the website
Fishermen Stories.
The new South China Sea fishing rules have not been disclosed publicly outside China.
At stake in the dispute are key issues of international freedom of
navigation, and China’s attempt to seize and control waters known to
contain large fishing grounds in addition to untapped reserves of oil
and natural gas.
China
imposes fishing curbs: New regulations imposed Jan. 1 limit all foreign
vessels from fishing in a zone covering two-thirds of the South China
Sea.
China last month set off an international imbroglio with Japan,
Philippines, South Korea, and the United States by declaring an air
defense identification zone over the nearby East China Sea. Japan
rejected the Chinese claims for the air defense zone. The Pentagon
ordered two nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to fly through the zone in a
challenge to the Chinese claims.
Then last month a U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser nearly clashed
with a Chinese warship in the South China Sea near Hainan island, as the
U.S. ship, the USS Cowpens, monitored Chinese naval maneuvers.
A State Department spokesman had no comment. “A Chinese embassy spokeswoman had no immediate comment.”
Secretary of State John Kerry said in Manila Dec. 17 that the United States wants maritime disputes in the region resolved peacefully.
“We strongly support ASEAN’s efforts with China to move quickly to
conclude a code of conduct as a key to reducing the risk of accidents or
miscalculation,” he said.
“In that process, we think that claimants have a responsibility to
clarify their claims and to align their claims with international law.”
Kerry said the East China Sea air defense zone should not be
implemented and warned China to “refrain from taking similar unilateral
actions elsewhere in the region, and particularly over the South China
Sea.”
Chinese state media have reported that due to the international
backlash over the East China Sea zone, China is unlikely to declare a
similar air defense zone in the South China Sea.
The no-fishing zone over two thirds of the South China Sea appears to
be China’s effort to bolster its maritime sovereignty claims in that
sea.
Analysts say the new Chinese fishing rules are likely to trigger larger disputes among China and other Southeast Asian states.
“This is truly significant, but not unexpected,” said former State Department official and China affairs expert John Tkacik.
Tkacik said declaration of the new Hainan maritime zone appears to be
part of a policy by China of gradually tightening controls in the
region. Earlier, Beijing had declared the entire South China Sea as its
territory under a vague “Nine-Dash Line” covering the sea that Beijing
claimed as an exclusive economic zone.
“Beijing is now stepping beyond its previous vagueness on the legal
status of the ‘Nine Dash Line’ to promulgating a ‘provincial measure’ to
see what the push-back is,” he said.
Declaration of the new Hainan fishing zone also appears to be
designed to gradually force Southeast Asian states, Japan, and the
United States to accept Chinese maritime encroachment.
Vietnam and China clashed militarily several times in the past 30
years over the Paracel islands, which are included in the new zone.
Chinese ships fired on two Vietnamese fishing boats in 2005, killing 9
people. Video from Vietnam posted online several years ago also showed
Chinese patrol boats firing machine guns at Vietnamese fishermen near
the Paracels.
Additionally, Chinese naval vessels have confronted the Philippines
over its claims to the Spratly islands, also located within the new
Hainan no-fishing zone.
Other disputed fisheries in the Hainan zone include the Macclesfield
Bank, located east of the Parcels, and Scarborough Shoal, near the
Philippines’ Luzon Island.
China also has harassed U.S. intelligence-gathering ships in the South China Sea during the past several years.
The South China Sea was the scene of a U.S.-China military
confrontation Dec. 5 when a Chinese navy tank landing ship sailed and
stopped some 100 yards in front of the USS Cowpens, a guided missile
cruiser.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel called the Chinese attempt to stop the
Cowpens “irresponsible” and said the incident could have triggered a
larger military showdown.
Tkacik said Southeast Asia states could challenge the new no-fishing
zone through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
“China is clearly flouting [the convention] with this announcement,” he said.
Beijing will likely deflect criticism of the no-fishing zone by
claiming it was initiated by a regional government and thus is not part
of national policy. However, China is not likely to rescind the rules
and could initiate similar fishing restrictions in the East China Sea.
U.S. policymakers appear to believe that the U.S. Navy is sufficient
to maintain and defend U.S. maritime rights under international law,
without the U.N. Law of the Sea convention, Tkacik said, noting that
while Japan has signed up to the convention, the United States has not.
“As China’s navy grows stronger—and the U.S. Navy shrinks—Washington’s options will run out in a few years,” he said.
“I don’t know that anyone in Washington, either at State or the
Pentagon, is thinking this challenge out beyond a year,” he added. “It
is America’s misfortune that it no longer has any real maritime
strategists.”