Friday, April 19, 2013

FOR CHINESE SPEAKING READERS

国内有些专家质疑中国南海传统九段线(1)

2013-04-01 11:01:15 范进发 人民网
隆重举行“扎根南海、守卫南海、建功南海”宣誓仪式,坚定官兵不辱使命、“能打仗、打胜仗”的信心。
  近日,海军南海舰队联合机动编队展开远海训练。从公开报道的情况看,此次海军赴南沙和西太平洋训练可圈可点。
    实战化训练,检验对海、对空、对潜和对岸作战能力
    国防部发言人说,这次南海舰队联合机动编队训练,总目的就是通过实战化训练,检验海军遂行多样化军事任务的能力。
    实 战化训练,目前主要强调复杂电磁环境下的多兵种对抗训练。对于海上联合机动编队作战来说,主要是提高对海、对空、对潜和对岸四个方面作战能力。对海就是对 敌水面舰船作战,对空就是对敌飞机和导弹作战,对潜就是对敌潜艇的攻击和防御,对岸就是对陆地上的目标实施打击。此次演练这四个方面的内容全部训练到了。
    所谓检验性训练,也称为考核性演练,属我国军事训练的最高层次,各级指战员最为重视。检验和考核重点在于发现训练中存在的问题。我国海军现在强调的是检讨式训练,重在发现训练中的不足和薄弱环节,然后再针对问题和不足进行有针对性的反复训练,进而提高训练质量。
    从训练内容上看,这次是编队训练。在出海之前,一般先要进行港岸训练,然后再到海上训练,即“港岸苦练、海上精练”,主要是为了提高训练效益。在此之前,还要完成单舰训练,才能拉到海上进行编队合同训练。

Monday, April 8, 2013

China to open disputed islands to tourism: official

 

 

Agence France-Presse

China to open disputed islands to tourism: official
File photo
Beijing: China is to open disputed South China Sea islands up to tourism this month, state media reported on Sunday, a move likely to inflame a long-running territorial row with its neighbours.

The plans to allow tourists to visit the Paracel Islands before the May Day holiday is the latest stage in Beijing's development of the territory, which has previously angered Vietnam and caused concern in Washington.

Vietnam and China have a longstanding territorial row over the Paracel Islands. Hanoi last month accused a Chinese vessel of firing on one of its fishing boats which had sailed in disputed waters in the area.

The plan to allow cruise tours follows rapid development of infrastructure in a new city -- Sansha -- along with the establishment of an army garrison on one of the Paracels last year.

Tourists can only visit the islands on cruise ships as the hotels and other facilities are inadequate, news agency Xinhua said, citing Tan Li, executive vice governor of the southern province of Hainan.

Tan was speaking on Saturday at the Boao Forum for Asia, which is being held in Hainan.

The report quoted shipbuilder Haihang Group Corp Ltd as saying its cruise ship was ready to take almost 2,000 passengers on a tour of the islands. A second cruise ship was being built by Hainan Harbor and Shipping Holdings Co, the report added.

"The tour prices will be relatively high due to the high costs of tourism infrastructure construction," Hainan-based tour agency general manager Huang Huaru told Xinhua.

Tan said local authorities would build more supply ships and ports, and beef up the infrastructure in Sansha.

The city was established last summer to administer more than 200 islets, sandbanks and reefs in the South China Sea, which also include the Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bank.

All the territory within the two million square kilometres (800,000 square miles) of waters under Sansha's "control" is disputed. The South China Sea is also home to vital shipping lanes and substantial proven and estimated oil and gas deposits.

Located on Yongxing Island, Sansha is home to about 1,000 people, mainly involved in the fishing industry.

Residents of China's newest city rely on ships for fresh water and other materials. The Paracels' only hotel, which has 56 rooms, is also on the island.

Inhabitants have access to a bank and a supermarket, photos on the Internet show. There is a library painted in a salmon-coloured hue and a basketball court shaded by palm trees.

Other pictures depict people relaxing in hammocks outside their modest dwellings.

China has occupied the Paracels, known as Xisha in Chinese, since a brief war with South Vietnam in 1974. It is a cluster of about 40 islets, sandbanks and reefs.

Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia all have rival claims to parts of the South China Sea, while the United States is also watching Beijing's increased assertiveness.

In his address opening China's parliament last month, former Premier Wen Jiabao said Beijing should "develop the marine economy... and safeguard China's maritime rights and interests".

Sunday, March 17, 2013

Spratly Islands dispute defines China-Vietnam relations 25 years after naval clash



South China Morning Post Sunday, 17 March, 2013, 12:00am 

NewsAsia ANALYSIS: SOUTH CHINA SEA

Greg Torode, Chief Asia correspondent
25 years after China's naval clash with Vietnam at Johnson Reef, a second military battle is seen as unlikely - but Beijing's ambitions are growing
The 25th anniversary this past week of the naval clash between China and Vietnam in the Spratly Islands is not merely cause to reflect on history; it speaks to one of the more disturbing contingencies in the South China Sea now exercising minds in the region.
The 1988 clash at Johnson Reef saw Chinese naval frigates sink two Vietnamese ships, leaving 64 sailors dead - some shot while standing on a reef - and remains a point of friction between the two nations. But its broader significance lies in the strategic nature of the operation.
The battle's aftermath saw China take and secure its first six holdings in the Spratlys - fortifications that remain important today, with one at Fiery Cross reef housing an early warning radar. Fourteen years earlier the PLA navy had routed the South Vietnamese navy to complete its occupation of the Paracels to the north - islands being built up into a formidable military base.
At some point, some analysts note, China might want to secure the rest of the Spratlys as its maritime power grows - a reflection of Beijing's sovereign claims to the South China Sea as well as the strategic value of the archipelago, which straddles some of the world's most important sea lanes and sits atop rich oil and gas reserves and fish stocks. That remains a source of constant worry for military planners in Hanoi.
Privately, PLA officials and Chinese scholars talk frankly of potential friction over Vietnam's 25 fortified holdings in the Spratlys - far more than any other claimant and running loosely in a band from the southwest to the northeast. Many were built in a frenzy of Vietnamese activity in the months after the clash.
It is not just a question of Chinese sovereignty, they say; the holdings might one day be used to contain China, as Vietnam's own naval development continues and its ties with the US and its allies deepen.
"The Vietnamese must know that we will never allow them to even attempt to contain us through those bases," one PLA strategist said.
Gary Li, a senior analyst with IHS Fairplay in London, said the situation in the South China Sea was now vastly different to that of 1988. Beijing's strategists realise that international attention on the area - and increasing Vietnamese naval capabilities that have made its coastline a "shooting gallery" - mean that using force to grab reefs and atolls is no longer a sound strategy.
Instead, China is building up its unchallenged hold on the Paracels while asserting sovereignty over the Spratlys through an intensified presence at sea with both naval and paramilitary fleets of vessels.
"Compared with the time when the physical occupation of the islands meant everything, China has had to shift its strategy to one of dominance of the maritime domain. So long as Vietnam doesn't base cruise missile batteries and extensive radars on its holdings, or work too closely with the US, for example, China knows it can keep to this strategy," Li said.
"They will be able dominate the area irrespective of actual islands and it will also allow them to protect any enhanced efforts to explore for oil in the coming years as well."
For a sense of the frictions over the incident, look at YouTube footage and comments that include extreme nationalistic rants and sexually violent taunts.
While Vietnam's state press played down the recent anniversary of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war - amid pressure from Beijing - several pieces last week highlighted the efforts of the navy's young "martyrs".
"The history of their blood has permeated every grain of sand," one commentator wrote, the language a reminder of the intensity of Vietnamese claims.
A protest in downtown Hanoi was not covered by state media, however, while the Chinese state press ignored the anniversary. Chinese microbloggers touted the success of the venture, saying it must not be forgotten. One compared it to a possible future confrontation with Japan over the disputed Diaoyu islands.
"Should there be a war between China and Japan, it should be confined to the sea only, just like the war between China and Vietnam. China can defeat Japan just like it did to Vietnam."
Additional reporting by Teddy Ng
Topics: 
Spratly Islands
South China Sea
Territorial Disputes
Vietnam
Chinese Navy

Sunday, February 24, 2013

6 Ways to Prevent a Conflict Between Tokyo and Beijing


There are many reasons why China and Japan won't go to war. Now is the time to explore how to actively prevent it.
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The ongoing crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands may be bringing Asia to the cusp of war. Trefor Moss recently wrote that a Japan-China war over these disputed islands is very unlikely. That could be right. Or it could be wrong. But even a very small chance of a Sino-Japanese war breaking out in 2013 is enough reason to work to try to prevent it.
What follows is a six-point plan to seek to deescalate the dispute in the short term. It is no doubt flawed and incomplete, but international diplomacy is never perfect, nor does it have to be. However imperfect a resolution to this dispute may be, it is almost certainly preferable to war for all parties involved.

The following recommendations are directed at Chinese and Japanese decision-makers:

1. Remember the price of war.
Looking at a two-dimensional military map, drawing arrows and moving colored chips across it is the highest possible abstraction of war. The strategist’s viewpoint reduces lives to tokens, dehumanizes war, and gives the mistaken illusion that killing and dying is as simple as a game of chess. Always remember the costs of war when making decisions of such gravity. Transport your mind into that of the soldiers and sailors you are sending to their graves. Ask yourself, as the philosopher does, what becomes of your humanity “while half a pound of lead, sent from the distance of a hundred steps, pierces my body, and I die at twenty years of age, in inexpressible torments, in the midst of five or six thousand dying men…” As an unnamed source put it, “there’s some 24-year-old kid in the Japanese Coast Guard who has a family and friends. At some point he’s going to take a .50 caliber round over this.” Always bear these images in your mind before you commit lives to the horrible business of war.
Photo Credit: Readmore

Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Japan’s ASEAN Charm Offensive

By Prashanth Parameswaran

ASEAN
Why are high-level Japanese officials converging on Southeast Asian capitals so soon after the election of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe just a few weeks ago?
Of the four countries that newly-installed Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida chose to visit in his first trip abroad, three of them – the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei – were ASEAN nations. And Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe embarked on his own three-country tour of Southeast Asia last week, which covered Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia. That was also Abe’s first trip abroad, though in his case it was more by circumstance than design since an effort to visit the United States first fell through (Abe will now visit the U.S. next month). Abe’s tour was also cut short by the ongoing hostage crisis in Algeria. Nonetheless, the question begs: why is Japan so aggressively courting Southeast Asia now?
Japan’s interest and role in Southeast Asia is nothing new and extends beyond current concerns about China. In fact, Japan has long been one of ASEAN’s oldest and most important dialogue partners. Relations began warming as early as 1977, when Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda decided upon his election to improve Tokyo’s image in the region which was marred by the Japanese occupation during World War II. Japan has since played a prominent role in Southeast Asia through its economic assistance, businesses, and culture, even as the entrance of other actors like China and Tokyo’s own economic woes have precluded a more assertive role in the region.
Yet it is also true that a confluence of contemporary events is making 2013 an important year for consolidating relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. Symbolically, it is the 40th anniversary of ASEAN-Japan relations this year. Thus, one can expect many more exchanges and ceremony than usual among Tokyo and Southeast Asian countries over the next few months, much like ASEAN and India had in 2012 when they celebrated their 20th anniversary.
More importantly, the list of common interests between Japan and Southeast Asia is arguably longer now than ever before. Economically, Japan is seeking new markets amid its fourth recession since 2000 and souring relations with China, while ASEAN is looking for partners to help it forge a cohesive ASEAN Economic Community by the end of 2015 through funding infrastructure projects. For instance, during Abe’s recent visit to Bangkok, Thailand’s Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra reiterated her country’s desire for Japanese involvement in a Dawei port project it is working on with Myanmar, an initiative which Tokyo has expressed interest in. 
In the security sphere, both Japan and many Southeast Asian states currently have territorial disputes with China, in addition to a diverse range of common vital security interests ranging from natural disasters to drugs and terrorism. For example, Japan’s provision of 10 patrol boats to strengthen the Philippine coast guard by 2014 was a major discussion point during Kishida’s meeting with Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario. The Japan-Philippine relationship is a particularly important one as Tokyo is one of Manila’s only two strategic partners and both are U.S. allies. Symbolism also matters here in that Manila was where Fukuda issued his famous speech in August 1977 on ASEAN-Japan relations, which later became known as the Fukuda Doctrine.
A number of other areas could see development in ASEAN-Japan relations in 2013. Energy security will likely be emphasized since it is vital to realizing the ASEAN Economic Community and is a priority for Brunei who is chairing ASEAN this year. Progress could also be made on cyber security, as both sides are particularly vulnerable to attacks (some from China) and have reportedly begun discussions on setting up a cyberdefense network.
The exact path to strengthening relations between Japan and Southeast Asia will be forged by both sides in the coming months. But the need for cooperation, not just on China but across a range of fields, is clear. Southeast Asia watchers should add ASEAN-Japan relations to their list of things to keep an eye on for the rest of 2013.

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