Hundred Viet's (Bai Yue): Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan

Source: The Diplomat/ April 13, 2012

Author: Mark Stokes & Russell Hsiao

AirSea Battle shouldn’t only be about the United States. Working closely with Taiwan could pay dividends and help ensure a stable military balance in the Asia-Pacific.

U.S. Representative Randy Forbes’s (R-Va) article in The Diplomat last month entitled “America’s Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision” called upon Congress to support the Pentagon’s vision for Air-Sea Battle – a concept designed to improve the joint and combined ability of air and naval forces to project power in the face of anti-access and area denial challenges. More specifically, Rep. Forbes pointed out that the United States should “work to bring our allies into this effort.” Indeed, in order for the United States to effectively project power in an anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) environment, networked alliances and ad hoc coalition partnerships would be essential in making U.S. power projection in the Asia-Pacific more resilient and responsive to both the internal and external dynamics of the emerging regional security challenges.
To be sure, the United States faces a number of challenges in meeting its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Beyond uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change, challenges include growing resource constraints and an increasingly assertive and capable China. At least one driver for rethinking U.S. defense strategy is the growing ability of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to complicate U.S. ability to project joint power and operate in the Asia-Pacific region. These emerging PLA A2/AD capabilities not only could complicate U.S. ability to operate, but also imperil regional powers’ ability to deny the PLA air superiority and command of the seas. Anti-access threats, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area, include long-range precision strike systems that could be employed against bases and moving targets at sea, such as aircraft carrier battle groups. Area denial involves shorter-range actions and capabilities designed to complicate an opposing force’s freedom of action in all domains (i.e., land, air, space, sea and cyber).
The Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle and the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) transcends pure operational and roles of services issues to include cooperation with allies and ad hoc coalition partners in the region, which is critical for ensuring the success of Air Sea Battle and assured operational access. As former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen said, Air-Sea Battle is “a prime example of how we need to keep breaking down stovepipes between services, between federal agencies and even between nations.” He further noted that the Services should “integrate our efforts with each other and with our civilian counterparts” and “work seamlessly with old allies and new friends.” Air Sea Battle and the broader JOAC shore up deterrence and demonstrate to U.S. allies and partners that Washington is committed and able to resist Chinese military coercion.
Addressing these challenges requires greater collaboration not only within the U.S. defense establishment, but effective leveraging of talents of allies and ad hoc coalition partners in the region. The U.S. reportedly has begun examining how to diversify defense relations with traditional allies in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Yet, little consideration appears to have been given to the significant role that Taiwan could play in an evolving U.S. defense strategy, including the JOAC and Air-Sea Battle. Taiwan’s future and U.S. interests in regional security are intimately related. Indeed, Taiwan is a core interest of the United States and has a pivotal role to play as an ad hoc coalition partner in Air-Sea Battle, JOAC, and the strategic rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific.
First, Taiwan should be the central guiding focus of defense planning in the Asia-Pacific region. In assessing JOAC and Air-Sea Battle-related requirements, the greatest emphasis should be placed on contingency planning for a PLA amphibious invasion of Taiwan with minimal warning. Based on a premature and faulty assumption that cross-Strait trade and investment will inevitably lead toward Taiwan’s democratic submission to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authoritarian rule, prominent analysts have asserted that the focus of U.S. defense planning should shift toward the South China Sea and defense of the global commons.

Photo Credit: U.S. Navy

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Chris Lee
April 16, 2012 at 10:40 pm
Considering interests of Wall Street and big coperations?
Do you think U.S. government can screw up China to cooperate with Taiwan?
The U.S. Government even screw up China to protect American job security for vote.
but screw up China by cooperating with Taiwan?
Good Luck!

Reply
TaiwanLink
April 16, 2012 at 8:55 am
@ Oro & aaron,
Interesting discussion. If they get past the subject line in this article, “abandon Taiwan” supporters and status quo advocates may sense the smell of flatulence in a crowded church in Foggy Bottom on a hot summer morning. Fear of Beijing incentivizes U.S. policymakers to keep the cross-Strait issue as quiet as possible, regardless of the obvious role that Taiwan could play in Air-Sea Battle. US cross-Strait policy is an issue that deserves ALOT more public debate.
The authors seem to have buried the lead. The central passage is this:
“…because Taiwan’s democratic system of government – an alternative to mainland China’s authoritarian model – presents an existential challenge to the CCP, China continues to rely on military coercion to compel concessions on sovereignty. The objective reality of the matter is that Taiwan, under its existing Taiwanese constitutional framework, exists as an independent sovereign state. Until the CCP renounces the use of force to resolve political differences in the Taiwan Strait, as well as substantially reduces its military posture against Taiwan, America should deepen and broaden defense relations with Taiwan. Acknowledging Taiwan’s pivotal role in the U.S. rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific region would be a proper starting point.”
Reading between the lines and focusing on the “constitutional framework” reference, this seems to be subtle advocacy for normalizing relations with the Republic of China (ROC). There is no “Taiwanese” constitutional framework (at least yet), only ROC. If interpreted correctly, normalizing US relations with Taiwan is a stretch. But the conventional wisdom needs to be rocked. It makes sense to introduce such a concept to a U.S. audience that’s being bombarded with unprincipled views, including those of Henry Kissinger, Zbig Brzezinski, retired profit-oriented four star admiral/generals such as Bill Owens, and so-called “realist” academics such as Charles Glaser among others.
Dual recognition in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely but possible within the context of a “One China” policy since the PRC and ROC constitutions can be interpreted as having overlapping territorial jurisdictional claims. In other words, “One China” is embodied in constitutional overlap. No need for all this “’92 Consensus” or “Taiwan Consensus” stuff. This is one why reason why the “Constitutional One China” concept of the Frank Hsieh faction within the DPP is interesting. As a guiding China policy for the DPP, it could allow for a broader interpretation of the “One China” policy in Washington. This assumes DPP supporters could play the loyal opposition in a DPP/KMT good cop/bad cop effort, and push dual recognition in the name of the ROC. The US side could even negotiate a U.S.-ROC Joint Communique to enshrine a “One China” policy in bilateral relations if needed, and maybe even a fourth US-PRC Communique! When you think about it, the only reasonable and enduring solution for stable, constructive ties with both sides of the Taiwan Strait is dual recognition. CCP success in alienating Taiwan legitimizes its reliance of coercive military power to resolve political differences around its periphery.
Would KMT and DPP Central Committees oppose normalization of US-ROC relations? Normalization would be a dream come true for the KMT and Ma administration, but they can not openly push it. It’s possible that they could push ROC sovereignty if Beijing steps up its campaign in Washington for a “thoughtful review” of the Taiwan Relations Act. Short of that, making trouble with both Beijing and Washington at the same time would be disastrous. Many senior KMT members thought Chiang Kai-shek’s refusal to push for such an arrangement in the lead up to the UN vote in 1971 was idiotic (see Jay Taylor’s fascinating bio of Chiang Kai-shek on this issue).
Between the Conlon Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of 1957 and the UN seat issue of 1971, the mainstream U.S. policy and academic community viewed dual recognition as in the best interest of the United States. Former National Security Advisor to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, operated in isolation from this community, and it’s an uphill battle to recover from the colossal mistake that he still tries to glorify. He sacrificed the dual recognition option in favor of short term political expediency related to Vietnam and Nixon’s flailing public image. Oddly enough, hardline nationalists in the DPP could undermine a move within Congress in favor of normalization if it implied Taiwan is part of “One China,” regardless of how loosely “China” is defined.
It’s helpful to focus on areas of consensus between the KMT and DPP rather than policy differences. There’s a natural tendency of both sides to paint the other in the darkest hue of Blue or Green as possible. Americans should understand democracy and this tendency. But they often buy into pan-Blue rhetoric that casts the DPP as crazed troublemakers intent on sacrificing every drop of American blood for Taiwan independence. And they often buy DPP rhetoric that the KMT is pro-China, which is implied to be synonymous with pro-Communist. The KMT dropped any reference to unification in their 2009 revised party charter. In 2009, Chinese observers slammed Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou as “mianli cangzhen” or “hiding a needle in cotton,” and a “dutai fenzi,” advocating an independent Taiwan. An “independent Taiwan” is defined as advocating shared sovereignty, coexistence of equal entities with each side having its own administrative jurisdiction that is not subordinate to the other, and a status quo calling for “mutual non-denial,” and highlighting unification as an option but not inevitable.
Final comment on the spy issue. Of course communist spies are a problem. It’s not just Taiwan though. If you were Chinese intelligence, and wanted insights on the most sophisticated U.S. equipment, would you invest much effort on Taiwan? Of course not – go to the source and break into DoD or US defense industry computer networks, or recruit guys with direct access. Like Singapore and other friends, Taiwan isn’t a formal NATO treaty ally and doesn’t get the top line stuff. Still, Taiwan is viewed as a security risk given PRC intelligence penetration, with Lo Hsien-che, a one star general cited as the most senior officer accused of espionage since the 1960s. If this is the best the PRC has done, then Taiwan’s counterintelligence community deserves kudos. Whatever Lo may have given would be minor compared to the coups Taiwan has pulled off over the last 20 years. Recent reporting indicates that China may be penetrated much more than Taiwan.
Beyond the cross-Strait context, a South Korea two star general was arrested two years ago for passing the country’s war plan to North Korean intelligence. The East Germans recruited secretaries to Presidents, Premiers, and so forth. At one time, an estimated 15,000 Communist spies were assessed to be operating in West Germany. Taiwan cases that have been publicized pale in comparison with West Germany and South Korea. And the United States maintained its alliance with West Germany and continues to maintain the alliance with South Korea. Let’s face it. If Chinese spies want the best information on US weapon systems, they won’t get it on Taiwan.
Good discussion!

Reply
Chinaman
April 14, 2012 at 5:59 am
Taiwan was the last piece in the Chinese civil war.Because of the Korea war,the US by force of arms has prevented the mainland from reuniting with Taiwan.In the long run the US will have to make a face saving exit.All empires come and go.The question is can the US defend Taiwan for posterity?
There is absolutely no doubt the US can destroy China many times .The PLA are getting weapons systems to wreak more destruction on US assets. They have not approached the assured destruction capability the US has over China but they are making improvements in the abilityto maximixe damage to US to reach 70%.
When thet figure is reached,the US will have to live with it even with damage limiting.
As for access denial,this is a defensive.China has no destoyers or carriers prowling off the US.A Chinese official has said the US islike aguy with a criminal record lurkingin your neighbourhood.If you live in that area,you will have to take counter measures.
Btw please don’t give the bs aboutdefenceless US crew on carriers.These guys have the power to blow up China and the world.The problem is after launching attacks on China,they won’t be able to fire the next missile which is troubling to Americans used to KOsovo and Iraq war.

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ACT
April 14, 2012 at 3:08 am
part of the reason that the United States is reluctant to deal with Taiwan is not only penetration of the island nation’s military and R&D by spies, but also the fact that any overt cooperation between the US and Taiwan on the level that the authors suggest could easily be used as grounds for invasion by the PRC. granted, they are looking to take most of Taiwan’s infrastructure intact (thus, political overtures) but i don’t think they’ll look a gift horse in the mouth either. Then there’s the what Leonard R. alluded to, the fact that Taiwanese politics have increasingly moved to a sort of middle ground of partial reconciliation with the PRC.

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- kcheng
  April 14, 2012 at 3:28 pm
  That is also a result of USA’s lack of resolve in standing up for Taiwan while criticizing moves by Taiwan even under democratic mechanisms that move toward solidifying its freedom and independence. It is blamed as having a carte blanche in “abusing” the TRA for any deepening of its democracy and possibly drawing US forces to Taiwan’s defense. These Taiwan moves are seen as being provocative to China and the USA is so overly sensitive to that. So it is a disappointment by Taiwan for this lack of resolve by the USA (which this article is describing) that has also led Taiwan to this perceived path of closer ties to China! USA has a responsibility to Taiwan.
  
  Reply
  - justrecently
    April 15, 2012 at 5:51 am
    USA has a responsibility to Taiwan.
    The U.S. administration, first and foremost, should be accountable to the American people, Mr. Cheng. If American service people are supposed to risk life or health for Taiwan, it’s not so much out of responsibility, but out of solidarity – free people who want to remain free sticking by each other. Yes, the U.S. should work closely with Taiwan, but ways need to be found to handle the leaks.
    America should try to shift its role from a hegemon to an ally. That would also mean that all allies take substantial shares in shouldering the defense burden. There is no way that the U.S. pay for the military (as long as the economic base allows for it), and everyone else prospers from trade. Only a hegemon can be told that he has a (unilateral, if need be) “responsibility” in an alliance. That’s the role of a useful idiot, only put more nicely.
    The same is true for my country (Germany) and for Europe. We also like to complain about our American friends when they turn nasty (GWB, Iraq War, etc.) but call for them when there’s trouble on our side of the Atlantic (Yugoslavia 1998, Libya 2011, etc.). Here too, it’s either American hegemony or partnership – and only partnership will prove to be sustainable.
    
    Reply
- Oro Invictus
  April 14, 2012 at 3:07 am
  @ Leonard R. & aaron
  Given the length of time the people of Taiwan and the mainland have been separated, as well as in the face of a much greater degree of cultural assimilation and synthesis by virtue of being a more open society than the PRC, I’d argue that the Taiwanese culture has developed into a fully independent and unique socio-cultural pathos completely divergent from modern PRC society; considering how more and more people in Taiwan identify themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese”, it seems a flawed assumption to assume that Taiwan will gravitate towards the PRC by virtue of cultural similarities. Likewise, assuming economic ties will foster greater support for the PRC by the Taiwan citizenry is a similarly flawed argument due to such increasing self-identification as a separate nationality and culture in spite of increasing economic ties (not to mention increasing disdain for attempted PRC policies).
  As a useful case-study one might consider Hong Kong: Even though Hong Kong is now under PRC administration and has greater levels of economic ties to the PRC than ever before, the people of Hong Kong have grown increasingly antipathetic to the mainland and have also began (though to a lesser extent than Taiwan) to draw a distinction not just between Hong Kong natives and the mainland, but between those from Hong Kong and the contemporary Chinese. If an entity that has effectively been annexed by the PRC has gone from muted criticism to increasing displays of animosity against the PRC by the citizenry, to assume a functionally independent nation which is already characterized by increasing antagonism vis-a-vis the PRC will effectively shift in the opposite direction and move closer to being assimilated by the PRC is a questionable notion.
  Likewise, from a more militaristic and/or geopolitical perspective, defense of Taiwan makes exceedingly great sense; defense of Taiwan in the face of PRC aggression would rally regional and global nation-states behind the US while also maintaining regional equilibrium and long-term stability. Indeed, Taiwan’s very existence as an independent nation effectively curtails much of the PRC’s ability to aggressively assert itself in the area; without Taiwan, logistical costs for both military and economic lanes and such in the region would grow increasingly costly for the US and any allied nation, while also weakening regional trade due to fears of instability caused by PRC encroachment. Ensuring the continued independence of Taiwan not only serves as a public opinion victory for the US, but also an economic one by ensuring stability in regional affairs. As long as the people of Taiwan do not desire to be joined with the PRC (which, by current trends in public opinion, there is no reason to expect they will in the foreseeable future), defense of Taiwan makes perfect sense for the US economically, militarily, and politically.
  Granted, the US wouldn’t be doing this out of the goodness of their heart nor necessarily because of any ideological impetus, rather it would primarily be a case of simple pragmatism; however, it is difficult to denigrate the US for this given every nation on Earth functions in the exact same way. What’s more, while I dislike the disproportionate power the US wields and will almost certainly continue to wield for the foreseeable future in both the SCS and globally (as, in a globalized world, theoretically each nation should have effectively equal say in geopolitical affairs), the US has, at least, been relatively (and I do stress relatively) benign as leading power; there is every reason to expect, given past history and the very nature of autocratic and non-pluralist nations, that the PRC would hardly be anywhere as benign an influence in the SCS in the same position. At least, with the current status quo, the region experiences a relative minimum of imposition on local affairs by the US, ensuring largely unhindered autonomy.
  
  Reply
  - aaron
    April 14, 2012 at 1:49 pm
    @Oro – What do you see as the defining features of Taiwanese culture and what makes it important enough for ROC citizens to choose “Taiwanese” culture over Chinese culture?
    In fact, the majority of Taiwanese do not see themselves as fundamentally “Taiwanese.” Rather, they see themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese; Chinese culture is the root culture, “Taiwanese” gives them a small degree of uniqueness. Here in Taiwan, the language (even Taiwanese language is a variant of Minnan language), intellectual traditions, religious traditions, racial identification and culinary traditions are dominated by Chinese tradition. As China continues to emerge and develop its soft power, more and more Taiwanese will come to respect the achievements of the Mainland.
    ROC military leaders do not want to be drawn into an American hedging system against the PRC. They’d prefer to keep things quiet and foster stability by strengthening economic and social ties to the Mainland. Ever notice how retired ROC generals are flocking to the Mainland to drink and socialize with retired PLA generals (not to mention their business ventures)? What does that tell you about the character of Taiwan’s military leaders and the direction of their politics???
    I like Taiwan and Taiwanese people, but they don’t have the will or the interest to be solid American allies. It’s their choice; they’ll be fine in the future.
    
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    Oro Invictus
    April 15, 2012 at 1:06 am
    @aaron
    I never actually said the majority of Taiwanese see themselves as a completely separate group, rather that the number of them who do so has been increasing dramatically. Currently, the breakdown is such that the majority see themselves as somewhere between “Chinese” and the entirely separate “Taiwanese” identity; notably, the next largest group identify themselves as “Taiwanese” and the remainder as effectively “Chinese”. The current trends, while it remains to be seen if and when the proportion seeing themselves as “Taiwanese” exceeds that of those seeing themselves as somewhere in the middle, show the amount considering themselves “Chinese” to be dropping precipitously while those considering themselves “Taiwanese” to be growing proportionately.
    A better indicator, though, may be the various polls regarding whether or not Taiwan should unify with the mainland; most prefer the status quo indefinitely, the next largest group desire the status quo with the eventual aim of complete independence, the third largest desires immediate independence, the fourth seeks the status quo with the eventual goal of unification, and the smallest seek immediate unification. Shifts in the polls have, likewise, seen the amount seeking independence (either in the short or long run) increasing radically with those geared towards unification dropping in kind (though the percentage of those supporting the indefinite status quo has remained largely unaltered). More intriguingly, polls which do not present the option of maintaining the status quo (though these tend to be smaller in scale, as larger polling groups appear uncomfortable with the political ramifications of suggesting the status quo cannot be maintained) show the vast majority of individuals desire independence.
    Similarly, the whole bit about the retired ROC generals going to the mainland should come as no surprise; honestly, wouldn’t you expect that the PRC would try to lure such individuals to garner information on the ROC? However, the fact that the citizenry and even the politicians seem unimpressed in quite telling. Indeed, the fact that the PRC’s propaganda overtures towards the ROC only having the slightest effect in the military (a much more monolithic organization removed of the pluralist elements defining much of the rest of ROC society), suggests that, despite vastly increasing the amount of funding geared towards shifting public opinion in tandem with increasing economic links, the failure of the PRC’s soft diplomacy campaign is the message rather than how it is being marketed. Soft diplomacy can only get you so far, as it cannot fundamentally change the beliefs of a people, particularly those in pluralistic societies; the checks and balances provided by differing belief systems inherently dilutes such things, removing much of the presentation of a message and instead breaking it down to its core message. That the aforementioned polling shifts have occurred and even accelerated despite the vast increase of time, materials, and effort the PRC has place into its PR efforts with Taiwan is testament to how flawed the people of Taiwan view this message to be.
    A useful analogy, perhaps, would be that of the social dynamics of the post-independence American Colonies; these were individuals who were, effectively, much more culturally similar to England than the Taiwanese are to the mainland (as relative geographic isolation and a more closed society prevented the same degree of socio-cultural shifts and adaptations), as well as one mired in complete uncertainty towards their future. These were people who had succeeded less out of martial strength or establishing and fortifying themselves against outsiders (the latter being as the Chinese who fled to Taiwan did) than the simple fact that England had deemed wars in continental Europe more deserving of attention and resources than those affecting the colonies. Like Taiwan, there were individuals who suggested reuniting with England as well as those who the colonies for England’s shores (that both of these occurred to even greater extents [primarily the former] than with Taiwan vis-a-vis the PRC is significant given the much greater degree of geographic separation between the Colonies and England). Despite all of this, the course of history showed the US able to solidify itself as a completely separate identity, despite various incursions (not just militarily) from England and associated entities (though, to be fair, the US did many times serve as the primary instigator for the aforementioned events).
    While it is true that there are some key differences between Taiwan and the US’ early years (primarily related to the colonial nature of the latter and pre-independence societal development, though certain aspects of pre-revolution China did allow for internal divergent development and establishment prior to the exodus to Taiwan), the sheer dynamism of modern Taiwanese culture when compared to the early US is such that such geographic matters are of little concern in terms of socio-cultural development (though, of course, of major concern economically and militarily). As long as the Taiwanese people do not desire unification then the civilian political establishment will (be it due to popular empathy or political modality) follow suit; likewise, while less susceptible to the influence of popular opinion by the citizenry, the military will similarly gravitate in a similar direction due to the aforementioned political support. As such, for the foreseeable future (barring the military reversing its current systematic trends and becoming more independent from oversight by civilian authorities and influences and/or the citizenry “doing a 180″ from current positions and seeking unification with the mainland) Taiwan is no less trustworthy an ally of the US than the majority of its various allies and associates.
    
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    aaron
    April 16, 2012 at 3:27 am
    You misrepresent the significance of retired ROC officers visiting the Mainland: it’s not just that China is luring them; it’s that retired generals are actively seeking to visit, and strengthen contacts with the PRC. Retired ROC generals have established organizations to facilitate this contact and they also invite PRC counterparts to Taiwan. The fact that most of the citizenry/politicians don’t care about these visits is a reflection of Taiwan’s apathy in the face of deepening PRC influence. The U.S. government has voiced its concern over these visits.
    As for the effects of PRC propaganda on the ROC military being slight, what evidence do you have to support this claim??? I’ve had discussions with ROC military officers and former soldiers which suggest that PRC propaganda and psychological warfare efforts have likely been effective in lowering military morale.
    Simply because some people identify themselves as Taiwanese and prefer the status quo does not mean that they want to take a stronger role in militarily opposing China. Most Taiwanese think it’s hopeless to stand up to the PLA and they prefer to seek stability by engaging with the Mainland and foregoing dreams of independence. A lot of ROC elites in the KMT and the military still desire future unification with the Mainland and they do not support the idea of strengthening military cooperation with the U.S. This ideological problem may be part of the reason why so many officials in Taiwan’s military and security organizations are willing to spy for the PRC.
    The social and political situation here in Taiwan stands in sharp contrast to what one finds in Japan. The Japanese government, and many in the public, see China’s military rise as a cause for concern and they have been steadily increasing military cooperation with the United States. I like Taiwan, and I wish I could share your optimism. Unfortunately Taiwan cannot, and does not want to be a military ally of the U.S. in the same way that countries like Japan and Australia seek to be.

Hundred Viet's (Bai Yue)

Trang

Thursday, April 19, 2012

Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan

Chris Lee

TaiwanLink

Chinaman

ACT

kcheng

justrecently

Oro Invictus

aaron

Oro Invictus

aaron

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