Pravda,ur21.05.2012
On the eastern, ascendant flank of
Eurasian continent, the Chinese vertigo economy is overheated and
too-well integrated in the petrodollar system. Beijing, presently,
cannot contemplate or afford to allocate any resources in a search for
an alternative. (The Sino economy is low-wage- and labor intensive-
centered. Chinese revenues are heavily dependent on exports and Chinese
reserves are predominantly a mix of the USD and US Treasury bonds.) To
sustain itself as a single socio-political and formidably performing
economic entity, the People's Republic requires more energy and less
external dependency.
Domestically, the demographic-migratory
pressures are huge, regional demands are high, and expectations are
brewing. Considering its best external energy dependency equalizer (and
inner cohesion solidifier), China seems to be turning to its military
upgrade rather than towards the resolute alternative energy/Green Tech
investments - as it has no time, plan and resources to do both at once.
Inattentive of a broader picture, Beijing (probably falsely) believes
that lasting containment, especially in the South China Sea, is
unbearable, and that - at the same time - fossil-fuels are available
(e.g., in Africa and the Gulf), and even cheaper with the help of
warships.
In effect, the forthcoming Chinese
military buildup will only strengthen the existing and open up new
bilateral security deals of neighboring countries, primarily with the US
- as nowadays in Asia, none wants to be a passive downloader.
Ultimately, it may create a politico-military isolation (and financial
burden) for China that would just consequently justify and (politically
and financially) cheapen the bolder American military presence in
Asia-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea. It perfectly adds up to
the intensified demonization of China in parts of influential Western
media.
Hence, the Chinese grab for fossil fuels
or its military competition for naval control is not a challenge but
rather a boost for the US Asia-Pacific - even an overall - posture.
(Managing the contraction of its overseas projection and commitments -
some would call it managing the decline of an empire - the US does not
fail to note that nowadays half of the world's merchant tonnage passes
though the South China Sea.
Therefore, the US will exploit any
regional territorial dispute and other frictions to its own security
benefit, including the costs sharing of its military presence by the
local partners, as to maintain pivotal on the maritime edge of Asia that
arches from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, Malacca and South
China Sea up to the northwest-central Pacific.) A real challenge is
always to optimize the (moral political and financial) costs in meeting
the national strategic objectives. In this case, it would be a resolute
turn of China towards green technology, coupled with the firm buildup of
the Asian multilateralism. Without a grand rapprochement to the
champions of multilateralism in Asia, which are Indonesia, India and
Japan, there is no environment for China to seriously evolve and emerge
as a formidable, lasting and trusted global leader warships.
Opting for either strategic choice will reverberate in the dynamic Asia-Pacific theatre. However, the messages are diametrical: An assertive military - alienates, new technology - attracts neighbors.
Finally, armies conquer (and spend) while technology builds (and
accumulates)! At this point, any eventual accelerated armament in the
Asia-Pacific theatre would only strengthen the hydrocarbon status quo.
With its present configuration, it is hard to imagine that anybody can
outplay the US in the petro-security, petro-financial and petro-military
global playground in the following few decades. Given the planetary
petro-financial-tech-military causal constellations, this type of
confrontation is so well mastered by and would further only benefit the
US and the closest of its
allies.
Within the OECD/IEA grouping, or
closely; the G-8 (the states with resources, infrastructure, tradition
of and know-how to advance the fundamental technological breakthroughs),
it is only Japan that may seriously consider a Green/Renewable-tech
U-turn. Tokyo's external energy dependencies are stark and long-lasting.
After the recent nuclear trauma, Japan will need a few years to
(psychologically and economically) absorb the shock - but it will learn a
lesson. For such a huge formidable economy and considerable demography,
situated on a small land-mass which is repeatedly brutalized by
devastating natural catastrophes (and dependent on yet another
disruptive external influence - Arab oil), it might be that a decisive
shift towards green energy is the only way to survive, revive, and
eventually to emancipate.
An important part of the US-Japan
security treaty is the US energy supply lines security guaranty given to
(the post-WWII demilitarized) Tokyo. After the recent
earthquake-tsunami-radiation armageddon, as well as witnessing the
current Chinese military/naval noise, Japan will inevitably rethink and
revisit its energy policy, as well as the composition of its primary
energy mix.
Tokyo is well aware that the Asian
geostrategic myopias are strong and lasting, as many Asian states are
either locked up in their narrow regionalisms or/and entrenched in their
economic egoisms. Finally, Japan is the only Asian country that has
clearly learned from its own modern history, all about the limits of
hard power projection and the strong repulsive forces that come in
aftermath from the neighbors. Their own pre-modern and modern history
does not offer a similar experience to other two Asian heavyweights,
China and India. That indicates the Far East as a probable zone of the
Green-tech excellence and a place of attraction for many Asians in the
decade to come.
Anis H. Bajrektarevic, Geopolitics of Energy Editorial Member
Chairperson for Intl. Law & Global Pol. Studies
Vienna, 20 MAY 2012
No comments:
Post a Comment